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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
TRUST AND THE GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY: THE
“SUPERFUND” MYTH AND THE LAW
OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
ALFRED R. LIGHT *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Two months after the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP
and the Obama White House announced the creation of the $20 billion
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust (“the Trust”) to pay individuals and
businesses suffering losses arising from the disaster. 1 Although BP
initially paid certain claimants, Kenneth R. Feinberg, a Washington
lawyer who previously administered the 9/11 Compensation Fund,
opened the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“the Facility” or GCCF) in
August to “independently” resolve disaster claims against BP. 2 As
publicly advertised, the Facility and the $20 billion Trust, to which it has

*

Professor of Law and Director, LL.M—Environmental Sustainability, St. Thomas University
School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida. This Article reflects events as of January 18, 2011. Readers
should understand that in this rapidly evolving area, inferences and conclusions have a “date-time
group.” The author thanks Professor Paul Kibel, Golden Gate University School of Law, and
Secretary George Sheldon, Department of Children and Families, State of Florida, for help along the
way in producing this Article. Any errors or omissions, however, are the author’s own.
1
Jesse Lee, A New Process and a New Escrow Account for Gulf Coast Claims from BP,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
B LOG ,
(June
17,
2010,
2:35
PM
EDT),
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/17/a-new-process-and-a-new-escrow-account-gulf-oil-spillclaims-bp; see also Alfred R. Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow of the
Law: A Template from the Superfund §301(e) Report, 40 ENVTL . L. R EP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
11,121 (2010).
2
The evolution of this facility and its first months of operations are described in some detail
in Light, supra note 1, at 11,121-23.
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access to pay claims, are designed to address claims by individuals and
businesses but do not cover governmental claims for cleanup costs, lost
revenues, or natural resource damages. 3
The Superfund “myth” is that a trust fund would compensate
victims expeditiously and avoid (or at least defer) litigation over the
liability of potentially responsible parties. 4 The myth of the GCCF
created last year is the same – those injured by the Deepwater Horizon
disaster will be compensated expeditiously without the delays and costs
associated with litigation. 5 This Article explores some of the issues
present in the GCCF context that are analogous to those that appeared
during the formative years of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA’s
unfortunate realities need not be the GCCF’s realities, at least not
entirely. CERCLA is a law of unintended consequences, where the quest
for quick compensation and remedial response (“shovels first, lawsuits
later” 6 ) became a ponderous litigation-oriented regime with high
transaction costs. This Article identifies potential unintended and
undesired consequences for the GCCF by exploring the surrounding
myths, with the hope that by doing so, some of those consequences
experienced under CERCLA may be avoided.
Part II explores the myth of the Superfund, examining the
similarities between CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),
which is directly implicated in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Part III
compares and contrasts the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust
Agreement, which establishes the $20 billion Trust with BP money and
authorizes expenditures related to the incident, with the protocols now
governing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility administered by Feinberg. Part
3

See GULF C OAST C LAIMS F ACILITY , www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4.php (last
visited July 5, 2011) (indicating the claims not covered by the facility include government claims,
real estate broker/agent claims, and the Gulf Coast Restoration and Protection Foundation (e.g., Rig
Worker Assistance Fund)).
4
See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). “Superfund” refers to the fund
created by Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) to address abandoned hazardous waste sites. Id. at § 9601(11).
5
Early on, Feinberg elaborated his philosophy in a speech to the Economic Club of
Washington: “Under this program, you will receive, if you’re eligible, compensation without having
to go to court for years, without the uncertainty of going to court, since I’ll be much more generous
than any court will be. At the same time, you won’t have to pay lawyers and costs.” See John
Pacenti, Plaintiffs Attorneys Knock BP Fund Administrator, DAILY BUS. REV. (July 26, 2010),
available at www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463865302&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=
Law.com&pt=LAWCOM%20Newswire&cn=NW_20100726&kw=Plaintiffs%20Attorneys%20Kno
ck%20BP%20Fund%20Administrator.
6
See DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA’S TOXIC
POLICY FOR THE 1990’S 29 (1992) (quoting Ann Bowman).
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IV compares aspects of CERCLA’s and OPA’s liability regimes,
focusing on affirmative and partial defenses, the role of causation
(especially proximate cause), the equitable allocation of responsibility
among liable parties, and the related issue of the effect of partial
settlements. Part V hones in on the ultimate critical issue – the
competition among various categories of claimants, including the federal
government, states, local governments, private businesses, and
individuals, for BP’s money. Finally, Part VI shows how the GCCF has
evolved while unintended consequences of the Facility’s original design
have surfaced and continue to exist.
II.

THE “MYTH” OF SUPERFUND

“Myth” has two definitions. It can refer to “a belief, opinion, or
theory that is not based on fact or reality,” so that “to mythologize” can
mean to invent or to make up stories that are false. 7 In this sense, to
mythologize may appear to refer to deception. On the other hand, a
“myth” can be “a legend or story, usually one that attempts to account for
something in nature.” 8 Most myths express a religious belief of a people
and are of unknown origin. Here, to mythologize can be a genuine
attempt to explain. To “mythologize” may be to “construct” a myth or to
“relate and explain” the myth from a critical perspective. 9
CERCLA’s “myth” lies somewhere between these two definitions.
After the Love Canal disaster in the 1970’s, the “lame duck” compromise
that created CERCLA deleted the toxic-tort cause of action for private
entities in the Senate Bill and focused the “compromise” scheme on
cleanup and natural resource damages. 10 The bill created the so-called
Section 301(e) Study Group (“Group”) to develop recommendations for
Congress regarding a private cause of action. 11 That Group ended up
recommending against extending Superfund to cover private damage
claims or creating a new private federal cause of action for damages.
Instead, it recommended a federal administrative compensation scheme
for those claims, coupled with state reforms of toxic-tort law. 12
CERCLA’s procedure to allow claims against the Superfund largely has
been unimplemented with respect to cleanup costs and unavailable with
7

24 WORLD B OOK DICTIONARY 1377 (1990).
Id.
9
Id.
10
See A LFRED R. L IGHT , CERCLA L AW & P ROCEDURE 12-18 (1991).
11
42 U.S.C.A. § 9651(e) (Westlaw 2011).
12
See Alfred R. Light, A Comparison of the 301(e) Report and Pending Legislative
Proposals, 14 ENVTL . L. R EP . N EWS & A NALYSIS 10,133 (1984).
8
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respect to private damage claims.
GCCF’s “myth” parallels that of CERCLA. Following the Exxon
Valdez disaster in the 1980’s, the OPA amended the Clean Water Act to
expand the trust fund not only to cover cleanup costs and damages to
natural resources, but also to pay claims for damages to private parties
that were unsuccessful in settling with liable actors. 13 OPA is different
from CERCLA, though, in that it permits recovery from either the
responsible party or the fund for damages to real or personal property,
subsistence use of natural resources, lost profits and earning capacity,
and public services up to a legislative cap of $75 million (except where
an incident was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct, or by a violation of federal law). 14 Like CERCLA, however,
OPA excludes claims for personal injury from its recovery regime. 15
Both regimes are, in part, false promises. Both systems purport to
establish a regime in which private claims may be paid by a federal fund.
Section 112 of CERCLA authorizes the Hazardous Substances
Superfund to pay private claims submitted for natural resource damages
and cleanup costs that are consistent with the national contingency
plan. 16 The claimant must present a claim to the potentially responsible
party sixty days before making a claim against the Superfund. 17 In effect,
this provision has never been implemented. Although the Environmental
Protection Agency has at various times over the past thirty years stated
that the claims procedure might be used in connection with “mixed fund”
settlements, this has never been a significant feature of the Superfund.18
Both the Hazardous Substances Superfund and the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund have been used almost exclusively to pay for cleanup costs
rather than damages.
Even without this dysfunction, payments from OPA’s Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund would likely be an unrealistic remedy for those
injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Claims submitted to the fund
had to be presented to the responsible party at least ninety days before

13

33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2762 (Westlaw 2011).
33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b) (Westlaw 2011).
15
See generally 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (Westlaw 2011); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (Westlaw 2011).
16
42 U.S.C.A. § 9612 (Westlaw 2011).
17
42 U.S.C.A. § 9612(a) (Westlaw 2011).
18
42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(b) (Westlaw 2011); Memorandum from J. Winston Porter, Assistant
Admin., Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, & Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Admin.,
Office of Enforcement & Compliance Monitoring, to Regional Administrators, Regions I-X, on
Evaluating Mixed Funding Settlements Under CERCLA (Oct. 20, 1987), available at
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/mixfnd-cercla-mem.pdf.
14
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submission to the fund. 19 But Deepwater Horizon immediately disrupted
the livelihoods of fishermen, shrimpers, and Gulf-dependent businesses
enough that their subsistence could have been grievously harmed within
the mandatory ninety-day window for the responsible party’s
“consideration” of claims. Given the massive scale of the disaster, it was
obvious that damages would rapidly exceed the $75 million cap on
liability. 20
III. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL TRUST VS. GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY
A careful reading of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust
agreement between BP and the trustees reveals a disparity between the
scope of the Facility and the Trust. While the agreement plainly excludes
the federal government’s claims for response costs from payments out of
the Trust, it just as plainly includes authority for the Trustees to pay
amounts settled by BP outside the GCCF, natural resource damages
claims (including assessment costs), and state and local government
response costs. 21
Natural resource damages claims, while uncertain, will probably be
enormous. 22 Since all state and local government claims are eligible for
payment from the Trust, some states fear that any restrictions included in
the GCCF for payment of individual and business claims might be
applied to them as well. 23 The scope of the Trust Agreement also

19

33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c) (Westlaw 2011).
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(3) (Westlaw 2011). BP Exploration and Production advised
Judge Carl Barbier that when handling the consolidated multidistrict litigation over the Deepwater
Horizon spill that it is “waiving” the $75 million statutory limit on liability under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 for damage claims from the spill. BP Waives $75 Million Limit on Liability for Damage
Claims from Gulf Oil Spill, 25 TOXICS L. R EP. (BNA) 1096 (2010). Transocean, however, has said
its liability is limited under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. Id. On November 12, 2010,
GAO released a report on the Gulf oil spill that said Congress should change the $1 billion perincident cap on spending from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for a single spill. GAO Calls on
Congress to Revise $1 Billion Cap on Oil Spill Trust Fund, 218 DAILY ENV ’T R EP . (BNA) A-10
(Nov. 15, 2010).
21
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust 1 (Aug. 6, 2010) (on file with author).
22
See e.g., Gulf Damages Assessment in Early Stages: Officials Say Full Accounting Years
Away, 142 DAILY R EP. FOR EXECS. (BNA) A-36 (July 28, 2010) (reporting natural resources
trustee testimony before Senate subcommittee on July 27); see generally Michael P. Coglianese, The
Importance of Determining Chronic Natural Resource Damages from the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster, 40 ENVTL. L. R EP . N EWS & ANALYSIS 11,100 (2010).
23
See Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Jim Smith, Eugene E. Sterns, and Daniel J. Gerber,
Florida Deepwater Horizon Legal Group, to Hon. Charlie Crist and Attorney General McCollum 8
(July 19, 2010), quoted in Alfred R. Light, Protocols for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: An
Etiquette of Equivocation, 25 TOXICS L. R EP. (BNA) 985, 988-89 (Sept. 23, 2010).
20
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explains equivocation in early draft protocols for the Facility about
whether the GCCF is the only way to present a claim to BP for payment
before proceeding with legal remedies under the OPA. 24 The Trust
Agreement clearly authorizes payments from the Trust where BP has
settled claims outside the GCCF that “relate to the Oil Spill.” 25 The
revised protocol released on November 22, 2010, provides, “Under OPA
a claimant must file a claim with BP or the GCCF for OPA damages
prior to seeking payment from the National Pollution Fund Center or
commencing an action in court.” 26 Therefore, a claimant does not have to
use the GCCF for presentation of claims to BP. 27 The GCCF is simply an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism that is totally voluntary, and
“participation in the GCCF shall not affect any right that the Claimant
would have had absent such participation until final resolution of the
claim is achieved.” 28 Despite this clarification in the protocol, GCCF
takes the position in its FAQs that all claims after August 23, 2010,
“must be filed with the GCCF,” rather than with BP. 29
Of course, the GCCF’s $20 billion Trust is neither a cap nor a floor
on BP’s liabilities. 30 If BP is successful in showing that the company is
not at fault (or has lesser fault than Halliburton, Anadarko, or
Transocean), the Trust, or BP by way of subrogation, might be able to
recover some of the $20 billion that funds the GCCF from those parties
in indemnification or contribution litigation. As of late December 2010,
GCCF had denied more claims than it had paid. In fact, it paid only about
$2.5 billion of the $20 billion authorized for the Fund. 31 In addition to
24

See Light, supra note 23, at 988.
The Trust refers to these as “Other Resolved Claims.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust,
supra note 21.
26
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY (Feb. 8, 2011), www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4.
27
The November 22 protocol thus confirms the conclusion stated in my article this past
September. Light, supra note 23, at 988 (“In my opinion, the Emergency Advance Protocol
equivocates about whether a claimant must present his final claim to GCCF before suing BP. Its
clarification can be read to permit a claimant to present his or her claim to BP and settle the claim
outside the GCCF (and, if BP refuses to settle, sue).”).
28
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ I.A.
29
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
GULF
COAST
CLAIMS
FACILITY,
www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq (last visited July 13, 2011) (“As of August 23, 2010, all claims
must be filed with the GCCF. The GCCF has replaced the BP claims process. Individuals and
Businesses should no longer present claims to BP.”).
30
See, e.g., Jean Helwege, The Gulf Oil Spill: Social Versus Legal Obligations Facing BP, 7
THE S CI T ECH L AWYER 6 (Winter 2011).
31
BP, CLAIMS AND GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL PUBLIC
REPORT—12/22/2010, available at www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/
globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/Public_Report_12.
22.10.pdf.
25
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this amount, the GCCF had allocated $41.5 million to state real estate
organizations for their payments to real estate brokers and agents—
groups that GCCF declined to pay directly because it refused to
acknowledge the validity of this type of claim on an individual basis. 32
BP had paid another $1.6 billion to governments, mainly for cleanup
costs. 33 At the end of 2010, GCCF administrator Kenneth Feinberg
speculated that $10 billion would be enough to compensate claims filed
with the Trust. 34 BP’s stock rose toward the end of 2010 when it became
apparent that Trust expenditures were lower than anticipated. 35
Ultimately, BP will likely pay out much more than $20 billion in
connection with the spill. One calculation by the Wall Street Journal
indicates that stock market participants expect the incident to cost BP
shareholders more than $50 billion. 36 In 2010, BP began to sell some
large assets as part of its efforts to raise up to $30 billion to help pay for
the spill. 37 However, it could also be part of a strategy to “reduce BP’s
empire” in ultimate anticipation of a bankruptcy filing in several years
under which it would reorganize, similar to asbestos manufacturers. 38 In
January 2011, BP made Russian oil giant OAO Rosneft its largest
stockholder in a $16 billion share swap. 39 Rosneft is state-owned. Under
the deal, the two firms will form a joint operating company—two-thirds
owned by Rosneft and a third by BP—to explore for oil in the Arctic
Circle. 40 Making another sovereign, particularly Russia, its largest

32

Id.; see also Ian Urbina, BP Settlements Likely to Shield Top Defendants, N.Y. TIMES ,
Aug. 20, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/us/20spill.html?_r=1&ref=ianurbina;
Light, supra note 1, at 11,126.
33
BP, supra note 31.
34
James Herron, A Good Week for BP, but It Still Faces Long Road to Recovery, THE
SOURCE, W ALL S T . J. (Jan. 7, 2011, 11:04 AM GMT), blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/01/07/a-goodweek-for-bp-but-it-still-faces-long-road-to-recovery/?KEYWORDS=oil+pollution++liability+limit;
James Herron, BP Shares Rise as Spill Cost Seen Lower, W ALL S T . J., Jan. 5, 2011, available at
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704723104576061332735278932.html.
35
Andrea Tryphonides & Colin Ng, BP Resurgence Helps Push FTSE Up 1.9%, WALL S T .
J., Jan. 4, 2011, available at online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870472310457606
2300209162130.html (“BP jumped 5.9% following reports that compensation payouts for the Gulf
oil spill may be much lower than expected. Continued speculation that it is a takeover target also
aided BP.”).
36
Helwege, supra note 30, at 6.
37
Guy Chazan, BP to Sell Canadian Natural-Gas Operation, WALL S T . J., Dec. 16, 2010,
available at online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704098304576021722396486948.html?
KEYWORDS=bp+sell+asset.
38
See Helwege, supra note 30, at 7.
39
Guy Chazan, BP, Rosneft Deal Draws Criticism, WALL S T . J., Jan. 17, 2011, available at
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704511404576085932247348132.html?KEYWORDS=b
p+stock.
40
Id.
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shareholder certainly complicates any U.S. court’s management of a
potential BP bankruptcy. Such arrangements also raise the prospect of
another “channel for avoiding listing all the assets of BP in a Chapter 11
case – to file at the holding company level and leave the subsidiaries out
of the equation.” 41 Just as Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco shed their food
businesses as they faced unfavorable tobacco-litigation outcomes, BP
might further complicate and possibly limit its liability through corporate
reorganization. 42
IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The parallels between CERCLA and OPA in the context of
Deepwater Horizon go far beyond the core myth of a Superfund
alternative to litigation. The role of proof that a “standard of care” has
been violated is another parallel between the two regimes. CERCLA
actually incorporates the strict liability of the Clean Water Act’s earlier
“oil and hazardous substance liability” regime through incorporation by
reference of 33 U.S.C. § 1321. 43 OPA uses the same incorporation by
reference. 44 At the time of CERCLA’s enactment in 1980, several courts
had construed the standard under this cross-referenced provision of the
Clean Water Act to be a strict-liability standard.45 The Department of
Justice (DOJ) noted this in its “legislative history” letter to
Representative James J. Florio (D.N.J.), floor leader for CERCLA in the
House. 46
As all good torts students know, making CERCLA and OPA “strict
liability” regimes does not necessarily eliminate the issue of a
defendant’s due care from a court’s consideration. CERCLA contains an
affirmative defense for defendants who prove that a release is solely
caused by an act or omission of an unrelated third party and that its own
41

Helwege, supra note 30, at 7.
Id.; see also Guy Chazan, Rosneft Tie-Up Shows BP’s Ability to Deal After Spill, WALL
S T . J., Jan. 18, 2011, available at online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704029704576088153707130740.html?mod=WSJ_Energy_leftHeadlines
(“Stan Polevets . . . said under the shareholder agreement between BP and AAR, TNK-BP should
hold the shares in Rosneft, not BP.”).
43
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(32) (Westlaw 2011) (incorporating “the standard of liability which
obtains under section 1321 of Title 33”).
44
33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(17) (Westlaw 2011) (incorporating “the standard of liability which
obtains under section 1321 of this title”).
45
See e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979);
Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977).
46
126 CONG. REC. H11, 788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), reprinted in 1, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY
ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 780 (1983).
42
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conduct was not negligent. 47 OPA does the same. 48 Both statutes reverse
the burden of proof on the standard of care. However, both defenses are
also ephemeral because the third party causing the response costs or
damages cannot have a contractual relationship with the defendant. 49 The
“contractual relationship” eliminating the defense does not have to relate
to the operation leading to the release, but can instead simply be “land
contracts, deeds, easements, leases, or other instruments transferring title
or possession” of the property. 50 Where there is a “contractual
relationship,” separate proof that the defendant “exercised due care with
respect to the oil . . . in light of all relevant facts and circumstances” is
insufficient to establish the defense. 51
More importantly, even in the usual circumstance where no
affirmative defense is available to a defendant, negligence considerations
are relevant to limitations of a defendant’s liability where there is more
than one responsible party and liability may be apportioned. In the
CERCLA context, the United States Supreme Court recently clarified, in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, that under
applicable Restatement principles, a defendant’s liability can be limited
if the defendant shows a reasonable basis for apportionment of an
indivisible harm. 52 However, the Burlington Northern principle avoiding
so-called “joint and several” liability is limited to situations where two
defendants “acting independently” cause a release. 53 Put another way,
the principle applies only when the damages caused by one liable party
are “divisible” from the damages caused by another liable party.
Limitation of liability is a determination of causation. “Damages can be
divided by causation when any person or group of persons to whom the
fact finder assigns a percentage of responsibility (or any tortuous act of
such a person) was a legal cause of less than the entire damages.” 54 Thus,
with CERCLA, the government learned (albeit over twenty-eight years
after CERCLA’s enactment) that causation determinations may not be
47

42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (Westlaw 2011).
33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(3) (Westlaw 2011).
49
Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3).
50
33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw 2011) (OPA); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) (Westlaw
2011) (CERCLA).
51
See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2011) (OPA); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3)
(Westlaw 2011) (CERCLA).
52
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009); see also
Alfred R. Light, Restatement of Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After Burlington
Northern, 39 ENVTL . L. R EP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,058 (2009).
53
R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF T ORTS: A PPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 (2000);
R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS §§ 433A, 879, 881 (1965).
54
R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. a (2000).
48
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entirely avoided even though “CERCLA . . . does not require causation
as a prerequisite to liability.” 55 In addition, another line of CERCLA
decisions establishes that “release . . . which causes the incurrence of
response costs” in the statute’s liability provision means that “[p]roof of
a causal link between a defendant’s release and the plaintiff’s
response . . . forms one of the ‘basic elements’ of a plaintiff’s prima facie
case under CERCLA.” 56
In some respects, Burlington’s “joint and several” jurisprudence has
no direct relevance to Deepwater Horizon since the contributions of the
various known defendants to the chain of events causing the spill are not
independent of one another. More traditional justifications for the
imposition of joint and several liability associated with persons acting in
concert apply. 57 For example, in some circumstances the employer of an
independent contractor may be liable for acts of the contractor. 58 More
generally, the decisions are relevant in their emphasis on the necessary
role of causation (or “nexus”) as a feature of the liability determination.
At some point, “adding to the penalties of the statute by making the
defendant liable for an unrelated harm could result in over deterrence.” 59
As Professor Marshall Shapo has noted, “What is important, in the end,
is that courts keep in mind not only the ‘purpose’ of a particular statute,
but the purposes of the law of torts.” 60
Interestingly, both CERCLA and OPA contain presumptive
monetary caps on damages recovery, as opposed to cleanup costs. Under
CERCLA § 107(c), the trustee may not recover in excess of $50 million
unless a showing is made that the release resulted from willful
misconduct or willful negligence, or from a violation of federal safety or
operating standards. 61 While OPA raises the cap to $75 million for OPA
spills and implicitly expands the cap’s coverage by expanding the
definition of recoverable damages, its wording is the same as

55

United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 937 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
56
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223, 1224 (D. Mass. 1988),
rev’d on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (Westlaw
2011); see also ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.2.7, at 80-82 (1991).
57
R ESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 15 (2000)
(“When persons are liable because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable
for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in concerted activity.”);
see also R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
58
See R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS §§ 416-429 (1965).
59
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach,
12 J. LEGAL S TUD . 109, 131 (1983).
60
MARSHALL S. S HAPO , B ASIC P RINCIPLES OF TORT LAW ¶ 56.05 (1998).
61
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c) (Westlaw 2011).
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CERCLA’s. 62 If a defendant sought to enforce such caps, it is unclear
what effect that assertion would ultimately have, given the broad savings
provisions for state-law causes of action. CERCLA’s savings clause
reads, “Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law,
including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances
or other pollutants or contaminants.” 63 OPA’s is similarly broad:
“Nothing in this Act . . . shall . . . affect, or be construed or interpreted to
affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person
under . . . State law, including common law.” 64 OPA’s savings clause
plainly preserves state laws that establish liability rules and financial
requirements relating to oil spills. 65 Therefore, any plaintiff, other than
possibly the federal government, may assert a cause of action for
recovery outside the strictures of CERCLA or OPA.
In January 2011, the Presidential Commission investigating the BP
spill concluded it was an avoidable disaster that resulted from
management failures by BP and its contractors. 66 Strangely, investors
interpreted this Report as reducing the likelihood that BP would be found
guilty of gross negligence. 67 By pointing to systemic failures in the
system of oil exploration and regulation, BP was also seen as having a
better chance of “clawing back” some of the costs from its contract
partners, Anadarko and MOEX Offshore 2007. 68 Professor David
Uhlmann, former chief of the DOJ’s Environmental Crimes Section,
nonetheless concluded that there may be a basis for criminal liability
under existing Clean Water Act case law, even though BP’s conduct was
not gross negligence. 69
A.

CAUSATION
Like CERCLA, OPA requires that the plaintiff incurring cleanup
62

33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a) (Westlaw 2011).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9652(d) (Westlaw 2011).
64
33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(2) (Westlaw 2011).
65
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000); see also Askew v. Am. Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
66
Stephen Power & Ben Casselman, White House Probe Blames BP, Industry in Gulf Blast,
WALL S T . J., Jan. 6, 2011, available at online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704405704576064122843672118.html.
67
Guy Chazan, BP Gets Lift from Oil-Spill Report, W ALL S T . J., Jan. 7, 2011, available at
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576065602870469870.html.
68
Id.
69
Id.; see also David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico,
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011).
63
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costs in connection with a spill establish that the costs “result from such
incident.” 70 While specific costs sought may be disputed, the CERCLA
experience suggests that courts may be quite deferential to plaintiffs who
have incurred such costs with the expectation of reimbursement. 71
CERCLA’s limitation of private recovery for response costs
distinguishes CERCLA from OPA, which provides for various forms of
private damages recovery. 72 However, both statutes permit governmental
trustees to recover natural resource damages. 73 Litigation under
CERCLA’s natural resource damages provision may be an indicator of
how “causation” determinations under OPA should be resolved.
In interpreting CERCLA liability in the natural resource damages
context, some courts have made reference to common-law causation
standards. For example, in Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 74 the
court concluded the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) position that the
traditional common-law standard of causation should be applied was a
permissible reading of the statute. 75 Consequently, trustees must be able
to meet traditional causation standards when showing that a particular
spill or release caused or was at least a “contributing factor” to a
particular injury. 76 The DOI’s Natural Resource Damage Assessment
regulations require that trustees determine the baseline condition of the
injured resource and then compare that baseline with the injured status of
the resource to quantify injury. 77 “Baseline” is defined as “the condition
or conditions that would have existed at the assessment area had the
discharge of oil or release of the hazardous substance under investigation

70

33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (Westlaw 2011).
United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1249-1250 (9th Cir. 2005) (costs
include indirect costs calculated with a “full cost” methodology).
72
See e.g., Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming disallowance of
costs of physical site maintenance, damage caused during asbestos removal, activities of counsel,
medical monitoring, survey of contaminated ditch); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728,
758 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (economic damages not corresponding to work closely related to cleanup
activities, such as lost rent, diminution of property value, attorney’s fees related to litigation and
experts’ fees, were not CERCLA response costs recoverable on property owner’s contribution
claim); cf. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (b)(2)(B)-(C),(E) (Westlaw 2011) (recoverable damages by private
parties).
73
33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011) (OPA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C)
(Westlaw 2011).
74
Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1124 (D. Idaho
2003) (requiring use of “contributing factor” causation test in natural resource damages action by
native American tribe and United States against mining companies).
77
See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (Westlaw 2011).
71
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not occurred.” 78 While a trustee has the burden of determining the
baseline, defendants are supposed to ensure that the trustee is apprised of
all appropriate conditions or factors impacting the resource other than the
spill. 79
Closely related to causation in natural resource damages cases is the
requirement that the plaintiff carefully articulate the injury. For example,
in New Mexico v. General Electric Company, 80 the court was not
satisfied that the plaintiffs validated their assumptions that water affected
by contamination could be used absent the contamination and that any
loss of use would be permanent. 81 Proving an injury to a natural resource
is not the same as proving what amount of damages should be
recoverable. Under CERCLA, any recovery obtained by a trustee of
natural resources must be used “to restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent” of the injured natural resource. 82
Since the GCCF protocols are directed exclusively to claims by
private individuals and businesses and do not encompass governmental
claims for natural resource damages, the causation requirement discussed
above is not addressed directly in the GCCF protocol. The GCCF,
however, has stuck to the original position in its drafts that it will only
“pay for harm or damage that is proximately caused by the Spill.” 83 Use
of “proximately caused” has been controversial. Based on the language
of OPA, some have argued that the statute’s causation requirement is
more relaxed than the traditional common-law principle. For example,
several attorneys general claim that OPA does not require proximate
cause and have urged Feinberg to clarify that it applies only to personal
injury claims not compensable under OPA. 84 In the final protocol,
Feinberg simply concludes, “The GCCF’s causation determinations of
OPA claims will be guided by OPA and federal law interpreting OPA.” 85
Earlier discussions of the BP claims process were more specific about
the nexus requirements GCCF would apply. For example, the drafters
referenced criteria such as proximity to the coast, dependence of the
plaintiff on the natural resources harmed by the spill, and a hierarchy of

78

43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (Westlaw 2011).
See 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (Westlaw 2011).
80
N.M. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1212 (D.N.M. 2004).
81
Id.
82
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(1) (Westlaw 2011).
83
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ II.G.
84
Letter from Douglas M. Gansler, Joseph R. “Beau” Biden III, & Roy Cooper to Kenneth
R. Feinberg 2 (July 22, 2010) (on file with author).
85
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ II.G.
79
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industries most clearly affected. 86 Until courts clarify OPA’s nexus
requirements, the protocol simply avoids resolving the matter by rule,
essentially deciding the question during case-by-case determinations that
are not disclosed to nonparties. 87
These determinations have been critical to the wholesale denial of
claims. The publicly stated reason for the large number of denials has
been the lack of documentation for submitted claims. This explanation
may cover a multitude of sins, but most of them are likely related to the
proximate-cause requirement. The Deepwater Horizon Disaster took
place in an unfortunate economic context for a region that was still
recovering from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Census figures for
Louisiana illustrate the relative loss of population arising out of that
disaster. Thus, businesses along the Gulf had difficulty justifying “lost
earnings or profits that were caused by the injury, destruction, or loss of
specific property or natural resource as a result of the Spill.” 88 The
adjusters in Columbus, Ohio, associated with Feinberg’s firm might
easily have looked askance at “comparable time periods” prior to
Katrina. And of course, claimants are also required to report “income
received from alternative employment or business during the period
when the loss occurred” and “savings to overhead and other normal
expenses not incurred as a result of the Spill.” 89
Claims for loss of real or personal property require documentation
as proof that the claimant’s property was “physically damaged or
destroyed as a result of the Spill.” 90 Even individuals trying to
demonstrate “lost earnings” need to show that their losses are a result of
the spill. For example, a fisherman claiming lost income might have to
show that his “fishing grounds have been closed as a result of the
spill,” 91 or a hotel or rental property owner might have to show that she
has “decreased profits because beaches, swimming, or fishing areas have

86

Video: Claims Overview—Darryl Willis—7 July 2010, BP, bp.concerts.com/gom/
claimsoverviewdarrellwillis070710.htm.
87
Kenneth Feinberg said on October 27 that he will not use a geographic test to bar
claimants and is seeking “the very best independent science” on the future of the Gulf of Mexico as
the program moves to its second phase of offering final payments to claimants. Feinberg Says
Distance from Spill Will Not Automatically Bar Compensation Fund Claims, 207 DAILY ENV ’T
R EP. (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 28, 2010).
88
GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY ADVANCE PAYMENTS 3
(Aug. 23, 2010), available at www.tpcg.org/emgevents/pdf/AUGUST%2023%202010%
20PROTOCOL%20_2.pdf (emphasis added).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 2.
91
Id. at 3.
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been affected by the oil from the Spill.” 92 Even those limiting their
claims to removal and cleanup costs are expected to show “information
or documentation explaining how the actions taken were necessary to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from the Spill” and “that the
actions taken were approved by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator or
were consistent with the National Contingency Plan.” 93
In various public forums, Feinberg has complained that claimants
have been unwilling or unable to provide tax returns documenting their
pre-Spill income. He has promised to accept alternative documentation
such as affidavits from employers or other trustworthy associates (e.g., a
parish priest) to vouch for a claimant’s pre-Spill work history. A careful
reading of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust agreement counsels
careful consideration of these documentation methods. Under the
agreement, the GCCF Paying Agent (initially Garden City Group, Inc.)
prepares and processes IRS Forms 1099-MISC and 1042-S in respect to
distributions from the Trust. 94 These forms report to the IRS amounts
subject to federal income tax. So, any shrimp-boat worker who
overlooked his or her obligation to pay federal income taxes prior to the
Spill will likely be contacted about such omissions when filing a 2011
return in connection with payments received from the Trust in 2010.
B.

ALLOCATION OF EQUITABLE RESPONSIBILITY AMONG LIABLE
PARTIES

CERCLA’s lessons for the GCCF are not limited to matters of
causation and documentation. The Deepwater Horizon disaster, like most
CERCLA releases, involves more than one defendant (i.e., BP
Exploration and Production, Inc.) who has chosen to settle claims. Even
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, which is broader than
the GCCF, does not purport to be a settlement mechanism for claims by
agencies of the federal government. Approximately 300 cases filed
against BP, Transocean, and Halliburton have been consolidated as part
of a multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Louisiana for
purposes of pretrial discovery. 95 Inevitably, the Deepwater Horizon
disaster will result in a need to resolve the same procedural and
substantive issues that have been addressed in multi-party CERCLA

92

Id.
Id. at 2.
94
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, supra note 21, at 6.
95
In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
MDL 2179, 2010 WL 3166434 (Aug. 10, 2010).
93
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cases over the past decades.
The most obvious of these issues is the so-called “contribution
protection” issue. Feinberg and GCCF have been severely criticized for
requiring that a Final Payment from the Trust be considered a complete
resolution of the claim, except for personal injury claims. A Final
Payment is a “complete and final resolution of all claims for past,
current, or future losses that a Claimant has or may have with regard to
the Deepwater Horizon incident and oil spill against BP and all other
potentially liable parties.” 96 Why does the GCCF require that a settling
claimant release not only BP but also Transocean, Halliburton, and all
other potentially liable parties? The problem is that a claimant’s separate
litigation against other potentially liable parties might well involve BP
and GCCF. Once sued, Transocean and Halliburton will likely implead
BP and GCCF into the litigation through third-party practice by way of
claims for indemnification and contribution. 97 This was a serious
problem under the original version of CERCLA because the liability
provisions of the statute did not address the issue. In the infamous
Seymour settlement, the United States had to agree in advance to reduce
its judgment against a nonsettlor to the extent necessary to eliminate any
contribution claims the nonsettlor might have against the settling
defendant. 98
However, in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, Congress added CERCLA section 113(f), which provides, “A
person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution for matters addressed in the settlement. Such
settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable parties
unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of others
by the amount of the settlement.” 99 OPA, like the original version of
CERCLA, does not address the contribution protection issue. As a result,
the only way for BP to extinguish litigation with a claimant is to have the
claimant release not only BP but also other potentially liable parties for
matters addressed in the settlement.
The “contribution protection” provision in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) was part of

96

Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ IV.B.
F ED . R. C IV . P. 14(a).
98
United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1347-48 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
99
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(2) (Westlaw 2011). Note that the precise terms of this provision,
drafted by the government in a self-centered way, do not address claims by private parties for
response costs under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B). See id.
97
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DOJ’s CERCLA litigation strategy. That strategy was to assert joint and
several liability in any CERCLA case as a means to avoid becoming
involved in the complex matter of allocating equitable responsibility
among all potentially liable persons. To the extent that the United States
is able to convince a court that a party is jointly and severally liable, it
can recover all costs and damages from that party without regard to how
they are ultimately allocated in contribution actions. The “contribution
protection” provision protects not only the settling party, but also the
government as plaintiff from involvement in comparative fault matters
central to these contribution actions. Interestingly, DOJ adopts the same
litigation strategy with respect to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. In its
complaint filed on December 15, 2010, the United States asserts the joint
and several liability of each defendant in the action: BP Exploration and
Production, Inc., Anadarko Exploration and Production LLC, Moex
Offshore 2007 LLC, Triton Asset Leasing GMBH, Transocean Holdings
LLC, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., and QBE
Underwriting Ltd., Lloyd’s Syndicate 1036. 100
Under the normal operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the strategy of the United States to avoid entanglement with allocation
among jointly and severally liable defendants would be unsuccessful,
because no final judgment is entered in a case until all claims in the
action, including contribution actions, are resolved. 101 The United States
has to wait for their resolution. Nonetheless, SARA also added, at the
government’s behest, an unusual provision that expressly allows a court
to bifurcate claims and to enter a declaratory judgment applicable in a
subsequent action for future costs. 102
The absence of these types of provisions in OPA is likely to present
the same kinds of difficulties that existed under the original version of
CERCLA. Defendants such as BP, which are unlikely to have plausible
defenses to liability or cannot apply the joint-and-several principle, will
seek an allocation of responsibility among liable parties before entry of
judgment in the government’s suit. 103 The government will vociferously
argue the contrary so that it may collect billions from BP without
implicating itself in the liability and allocation disputes involving other
defendants it has sued or third-party defendants identified by BP and
100

United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., filed Dec. 15, 2010, available at
docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/louisiana/laedce/2:2010cv04536/144523/1/.
101
See F ED . R. C IV . P. 54(b).
102
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(2) (Westlaw 2011).
103
Halliburton may have plausible defenses to joint and several liability but not to nominal
liability based on their due care. See Halliburton Disputes Commission Report Questioning Stability
of BP Well Cementing, 209 D AILY E NV ’ T R EP. (BNA) A-9 (Nov. 1, 2010).
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others. A court wishing to expedite the resolution of all Deepwater
Horizon claims, as opposed to simply expediting the government’s
recovery, may delay entry of judgment to force all the parties to resolve
allocation and other common issues. Efficiency from the government’s
point of view is not necessarily the same as efficiency from the court’s
perspective.
V.

COMPETITION OF FEDERAL, STATE AND PRIVATE CLAIMS

Ultimately, an even larger complexity of the Deepwater Horizon
litigation reminiscent of CERCLA litigation is the competition for BP’s
funds among the federal government, states, and other claimants. The
federal government’s December 2010 claim is not only for cleanup costs
and damages, but also for civil penalties. The National Commission on
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling recommended
that eighty percent of any penalties assessed for the spill go to ecosystem
restoration. 104 Commission staff also recommended that the government
and responsible parties consider restoration of consumer confidence—
notably, in Gulf seafood and tourism—as an appropriate place to allocate
funding when calculating fines and settlements. 105 These penalties
recognize that indirect economic losses are not covered by the
compensation requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 106 At the
same time, commissioners expressed much concern about
recommendations in light of what companies can afford. 107
The Commission’s recommendations are reminiscent of earlier
environmental disasters where comprehensive judicial settlements
included various environmental projects. For example, the Allied Kepone
settlement led to the creation of the Virginia Environmental
Endowment. 108 In 2010, BP moved aggressively outside the context of
104

Oil Spill Panel Moves Plan to Use 80 Percent of Penalties for Gulf Restoration, 232
D AILY ENV ’T R EP.A-10 (Dec. 6, 2010); see generally Carrie Presnall, Laura López-Hoffman, &
Marc L. Miller, Can the Deepwater Horizon Trust Take Account of Ecosystem Services and Fund
Restoration of the Gulf?, 40 ENVTL . L. R EP. NEWS & A NALYSIS 11,129 (2010), available at
www.eli.org/pdf/NA_40-11/40.11129.pdf.
105
Oil Spill Panel Moves Plan to Use 80 Percent of Penalties for Gulf Restoration, 232
D AILY ENV ’T R EP.A-10 (Dec. 6, 2010).
106
Id.
107
Id.; see also Oil Spill Restoration Chief Says Penalties Should Support Gulf Coast Cleanup
Projects, 25 T OXICS L. R EP . (BNA) 1008 (2010) (stating that Navy Secretary Ray Mabus released
Sept. 28 report asking Congress to amend Clean Water Act to divert “significant funds” from the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund to Gulf of Mexico restoration projects).
108
See Martin Harrell, Organizational Environmental Crime and the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984: Combining Fines with Restitution, Remedial Orders, Community Service, and Probation to
Benefit the Environment While Punishing the Guilty, 6 V ILL . ENVTL . L.J. 243, 290 n.55 (1995);
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the GCCF to voluntarily fund oil-spill-related efforts. Beginning in May
2010, BP paid the State of Florida millions of dollars to promote tourism
in the Gulf area and throughout the state. 109 BP also paid private claims
such as those by Virginia’s oyster industry for loss of one source of its
supply. 110 As to any penalty settlement, an agreement between the
government and responsible parties is not necessarily dispositive. The
Center for Biological Diversity has filed a citizen suit against BP and the
government, seeking penalties of $4,300 per barrel of oil spilled, which
is upwards of $20 billion, under the Clean Water Act. 111
The potential wild card in the Deepwater Horizon litigation arises
out of the government’s criminal investigation into the disaster. As of
January 2011, the DOJ has not filed criminal charges in connection with
the disaster, but doing so will vastly complicate resolution of the
numerous civil claims. 112 As environmental lawyers know, DOJ
separates its criminal and civil enforcement litigators, and the presence
of an ongoing criminal case makes civil discovery more difficult since
witnesses face the risk of incarceration based on their testimony. Often,
civil settlement negotiations are delayed until a criminal investigation is
concluded. Similarly, DOJ also separates its environmental enforcement
and environmental defense functions. It is likely that DOJ’s
environmental defense group will not be able to avoid its ultimate
involvement in the BP litigation. After Hurricane Andrew, a federal
judge permitted a plaintiff’s suit against the Army Corps of Engineers to
proceed on the theory that the failure of its flood-control projects created
monetary damages for which the United States was liable, the
“discretionary function” exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act to the

James W. Radig, Corporate Contributions to Charity as a Condition of Probation Under the Federal
Probation Act, 9 J. C ORP. L. 241, 247 (1984).
109
On May 20, BP agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding with Florida officials to pay
$25 million for Florida’s emergency marketing campaign to preserve the state’s tourism industry and
an extra $10 million for marketing support in impact counties. Agreement between Douglas J.
Suttler, CEO of BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., and David Holstead, Florida Division of Emergency
Management (May 20, 2010).
110
Pamela A. D’Angelo, Northern Neck Oyster Houses Share Pain of BP Oil Spill,
R ICHMOND TIMES-D ISPATCH, July 26, 2010.
111
In re: Deepwater Horizon, No. 10-2454 (E.D. La., filed Aug. 4, 2010); see also Center for
Biological Diversity v. BP America, Inc., No. 10-1768 (E.D. La., filed June 18, 2010).
112
A criminal prosecution is widely expected. See e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 69, at 1417;
John Schwartz, With Criminal Charges, Costs to BP Could Soar, N.Y. TIMES , June 16, 2010,
available at www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/17liability.html?ref=johnschwartz; Marisa Taylor,
Criminal Charges Likely from Gulf Oil Spill, Legal Experts Say, MCC LATCHY NEWSPAPERS (May
12, 2010), www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/12/94061/federal-laws-point-to-criminal.html; Justice
Department Probes Spill; Charges Expected, NPR MORNING E DITION (June 9, 2010),
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127586497.
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contrary notwithstanding. 113 It remains to be seen whether the failure of
governmental oversight alleged in the Deepwater Horizon disaster will
produce similar theories of government liability. 114
Therefore, it is in the interest of the government to negotiate a plea
agreement with BP “prior to indictment or shortly thereafter.” 115 Even if
criminal liability is available under existing law, establishing liability by
proving ordinary negligence, in light of the likely non-intentional nature
of BP’s misconduct, may spur Congress to “consider limiting criminal
liability for ordinary negligence to cases of endangerment . . . or cases
that involve substantial harm to the environment (like the Gulf oil spill),
and should otherwise require at least criminal negligence or recklessness
for criminal prosecution.” 116 Even then, the “concern is that the
egregiousness of the harm will divert attention from the culpability of the
underlying conduct.” 117
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The Gulf Coast Claims Facility has evolved since its creation in
June 2010. Feinberg originally invoked the Superfund myth – a regime
for quick compensation of claimants damaged by the oil spill without the
need for the expense or assistance of lawyers. However, he received a
firestorm of criticism when it became apparent that the Facility wished to
resolve and liquidate claims, rather than pay them on an open-ended
basis, and required documentation of damages and their connection to
the oil spill as a prerequisite to final settlement. This led to a retooling of
the Facility in late 2010 to permit, as an alternative to final liquidation, a
continuation of interim claims for persons who had convinced the
Facility to the extent of obtaining prior interim payments. 118 This quickpay option is narrow – interim payments after 2010 were quarterly
retroactive payments based on losses from the prior quarter, not for

113

Robinson v. United States (In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig.), 471 F. Supp. 2d
684 (E.D. La. 2007); see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 628-29,
637-39 (E.D. La. 2008).
114
See Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to Be
a Law, 40 ENVTL . L. R EP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,033, 11,037 (2010) (alleging “willful
blindness”); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the
Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL . L. R EP . N EWS & A NALYSIS 11,041 (2010).
115
Uhlmann, supra note 69, at 1418.
116
Id. at 1458.
117
Id. at 1460.
118
BP Spill Compensation Fund Moves into Next Phase, Offering Two Options, 226 DAILY
ENV ’T R EP . (BNA) A-7 (Nov. 26, 2010).
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losses in the upcoming month as with the prior emergency payments
system. Feinberg saw the need for this option in light of the large number
of claimants that lacked adequate documentation of their claims to justify
final settlements. 119
The paucity of claims paid by the end of 2010 also gave Feinberg
the flexibility to offer, as he did in December 2010, to pay attorney’s fees
for any claimants who wanted legal representation in connection with
their claims. 120 Exactly how this fee-shifting will work and how much it
might cost the Trust remained unclear at the end of 2010. 121 With
discovery in the Multidistrict Litigation scheduled to commence in
January 2011, the focus of attention may be on claims outside the scope
of the GCCF, like the government’s response costs, natural resource
damages, and penalty claims, rather than those of private individuals and
businesses that could have files claims against the GCCF in 2010. 122
Even where the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust may serve as the
source of payment for very large claims, such as those of states and local
governments for natural resources damages, the GCCF has disclaimed
jurisdiction. 123 On the other hand, Judge Barbier, who is handling the
Multidistrict Litigation, has asserted jurisdiction over some of these
claims, refusing to permit their adjudication elsewhere. 124 Ironically, the
less Feinberg pays for interim claims, final settlements, and
administrative costs, the more BP will have available from the $20
billion Trust for governmental claims outside the scope of the GCCF. If a
large balance remains in the Trust, it could be a substitute for the much
smaller Oil Pollution Liability Trust Fund. In this sense, at least, maybe
Superfund is less of a myth than it might otherwise appear.
Nonetheless, the law of unintended consequences appears in many
places related to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Especially in the early
119
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120
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121
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January, 225 D AILY ENV ’T R EP . (BNA) A-9 (Nov. 24, 2010).
123
See Lee, supra note 1; see also Light, supra note 1.
124
Louisiana Suit Against BP to Remain Part of Multidistrict Litigation, 25 TOXICS L. R EP .
(BNA) 1064 (Oct, 14, 2010). As of January 2011, however, the states continue to argue before Judge
Barbier that he should separate their cases from those brought on behalf of individuals and
businesses. Amanda Bronstad, States Seek Distance from Other BP Plaintiffs, N AT ’ L L. J., Jan. 17,
2011, available at www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202478067056&src=EMCEmail&et=editorial&bu=National%20Law%20Journal&pt=NLJ.com%20Daily%20Headlines&cn=20110117NLJ&kw=States%20seek%20distance%20from%20other%
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months after the blowout and largely for public relations purposes, BP
and the GCCF compensated victims that were only remotely associated
with spill. But the GCCF ultimately may not compensate many with
larger claims, and those claimants might decide to take a ticket in the
lawsuit lottery rather than rely on GCCF for a comprehensive settlement.
GCCF’s continuation of interim payments during the winter of 2010
suggests the law of unintended consequences of the original Trust design
still persists.
From a broader perspective, the nation’s renewed emphasis on
government enforcement might “simply lead to more government
workers without a concomitant increase in safety as captive regulators
play golf and dine out with their industry counterparts.” 125 According to
the Wall Street Journal, stock investors perceive the identification of
systemic problems in oil exploration as lessening the extent of specific
responsibility for BP. 126 The interaction of corporate law, international
law, and environmental regulation surely complicates the situation. As
the government pushes its case for criminal sanctions, that action may
delay justice for those who choose to pursue civil actions for damages,
because to the extent “we make the firm pay for every dime of damages,
our efforts may trigger a bankruptcy that results in lower compensation
to victims.” 127 Even without such direct conflicts, the inevitable
limitation of resources available to address this matter ultimately exposes
the competition for those resources among (1) individuals and businesses
allegedly damaged in an economic sense, (2) those in the oil industry
trying to produce the products upon which our economy relies, (3)
government scientists seeking ecosystem restoration, and (4) prosecutors
seeking retribution through criminal actions to “express societal outrage
about the spill in ways that civil penalties cannot.” 128
Just as dispersants have hidden much of the real spill below the
surface, the ultimate role of the GCCF in compensating victims may be
known only after we see how the complex components of that system
(government and private lawsuits, comprehensive settlements, restoration
of the Gulf oil, fishing, and tourism industries) play out and interact. In
other words, we are still seeing more of the myth than the reality of the
GCCF.
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